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Abstract 
A structural shift from transaction-based, marginal cost pricing to fee-based service business models 
often accompanies the emergence of “platform” markets, i.e. multi-sided markets where an 
intermediary captures the value of the interaction between user groups.   The many examples 
include telecommunications, data storage, cinema, music and media, and the automobile industry.  
Why not electricity?  In this paper, we explore how the electricity supply industry can be conceived 
of as a platform-mediated, two-sided market and the consequences for pricing.  Through two cases, 
a balancing services provider for smart home energy management systems and an electric vehicle 
charge manager, we show where a platform entrant could position itself in the retail electricity 
markets between supply companies and end-users.  The drivers of such a transition include 
increased volatility due to renewable generation, the new complexity of roles for end-users, and the 
introduction of information and communication technologies.  Conceiving of electricity as a platform 
market where new entrants provide an energy optimisation and management service may stimulate 
a competitive ecosystem and innovation.  We suggest that fee-based pricing would enable the 
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Introduction 
The general motivation behind this paper is to explore the application of platform pricing strategies 
in retail electricity markets.  Current structural transitions in the electric power industry introduce 
new actors and new roles for existing actors that may give way to the development of one or 
multiple platform markets.  Household consumers are expected to take a more active role and 
become producers, such as through selling small-scale photovoltaic energy production or 
participating in demand response contracts (UK Department of Energy and Climate Change 2012a; 
Kohrs et al. 2012).  Other changes in the competitive landscape include new entrants in retail 
electricity supply, such as service companies that design business models on the basis of smart 
metering data.  Established firms in industries such as retail and finance, such as Sainsbury’s and 
Lloyds Bank in the UK, for example, are also entering the electricity market by selling power in multi-
product offers and packages.  The increasing differentiation of electricity consumers by type and 
elasticity of demand, as well as the new complexity of interactions between actors on the 
distribution network, may lead to the emergence of “platform”-mediated interactions as has been 
the case in other industries whose business models have been radically affected by information and 
communication technologies (ICT).   
In this paper, we explore how the definition of a platform market applies to new business models in 
retail electricity supply for balancing services and electric vehicles.   We compare current pricing 
structures for retail electricity supply contracts based on marginal cost pricing to multi-sided 
platform pricing strategies.  We suggest circumstances when it is more profitable to charge a flat 
service fee akin to a network connection fee and to subsidise some user groups rather than charge 
all consumers a marginal cost-based price in £/kWh.  Other markets such as broadband, Internet, 
software applications and credit cards, where a two-sided pricing structure is already applied, are 
used as comparative examples.   
This paper is organised in 3 sections.  In the first, we review the current understanding of the 
definition of a “platform” market in the literature.  So far, there is little rigorous clarity linking the 
concept with oft-quoted examples and the definition of “platform” markets seems to be liberally 
applied to a growing and diverse set of industries in the literature (Eisenmann et al. 2011).  We 
revisit the commonly cited list of platform markets in the literature, adding a discussion of examples 
of what are not platform markets, and examples of markets that “could be considered” or “may be 
becoming” platform markets.  We discuss the following closely related concepts and how they link 
with platform markets: platform technologies, multi-sided markets, network externalities, bundling, 
and general purpose technologies (GPT).   
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In the second section, we take three examples in retail electricity supply and explore the implications 
of conceiving of them as platforms.  The first two cases are electricity balancing services and electric 
vehicle charging management.  We find that platform pricing is an appropriate business model in 
these two cases and discuss the associated re-allocation of economic value.  Platform pricing in 
electricity markets is presented in relation with the dominant pricing method, based on marginal 
costs.  The third case is the entire electricity supply chain from wholesale generation to end-users.  
We discuss where the platform analogy fails in conventional electricity markets (section IV.).       
--------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURES 1-3 HERE 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
I.  What is a platform, and what is not a platform? 
The “platform” label is applied to an increasing number of industries and businesses, often quite 
liberally.  A “platform” market by definition must be different from a simple market, where goods or 
services are exchanged via a broker or mediator, who collects revenues through a commission-type 
fee for the service rendered in enabling the interaction between two parties.  In this section we 
investigate which additional elements differentiate a platform market from any market, based on 
the definitions of platforms from industrial and network economics and strategic management.  We 
revise the dominant definition that includes interaction mediation and network externalities as 
necessary and sufficient conditions by adding complementary innovation, inherent added-value, and 
a role for ICT as necessary criteria for the definition of a platform.  We then revisit examples and 
past applications of the definition (Tables 1- 4).  The relationships of the concept with two-sided and 
one-sided markets, business ecosystems, platform technologies, and GPT are discussed. 
The two most widely accepted elements of the definition of a “platform” market are 1) the existence 
of one or more user groups linked by a service or product provider that mediates their interactions, 
and 2) the existence of network externalities (Eisenmann et al. 2011; Eisenmann, Parker & Alstyne 
2006; Rochet & Tirole 2003; Evans 2003; Armstrong 2006; Katz & Shapiro 1994).  Platform 
interactions are triangular rather than linear, with users interacting with each other and with the 
platform provider (Eisenmann, Parker & Alstyne 2006) (Fig. 1-3).  Hagiu & Wright (2011) emphasise 
that the platform provider must be a mediator that enables distinct user group(s) to interact with 
each other directly, thus differentiating it from typical sellers or input suppliers.  Examples of 
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platform markets include credit cards, video game consoles, online matchmaking such as recruiting 
and dating services, and text processors.  For more comprehensive lists, see (Parker & Van Alstyne 
2005; Rochet & Tirole 2003; Eisenmann, Parker & Alstyne 2006; Evans 2011; Hagiu & Wright 2011).   
The existence of network externalities in platform markets implies that the utility of users of a 
platform is related to the number of other users.  Cross-side externalities are externalities between 
users on each side of the platform, such as game players and developers, where game players are 
better off, the more developers use their platform, and vice versa.  Same-side externalities, which 
have also been referred to as “intraplatform competition” (Armstrong 2006) occur when users on 
one side of the platform are affected by other users from the same side, often negatively 
(Eisenmann, Parker & Alstyne 2006).  For example, software developers for one operating system 
are in competition with each other and may be affected by negative, same-side externalities.  
Network externalities affect the utility of various user groups (Armstrong 2006) and, as a result, the 
pricing strategy which the platform provider must adopt to attract users on each side (Evans 2003; 
Armstrong 2006).  Subsidising one user group by charging the other is current practice in platforms 
such as credit cards and software as a way of attracting and retaining a critical mass of users  (Evans 
2003; Economides & Katsamakas 2006).   
Modern examples of platforms are often associated with highly innovative business ecosystems, e.g. 
Apple’s AppStore or Android OS.  Do platform markets foster innovation?  The importance of 
complementary innovation is a third element often related to the definition of a platform market in 
the strategy literature (Gawer & Cusumano 2008; Ceccagnoli et al. 2012; Suarez & Kirtley 2012).  A 
platform market is a system (service or product) that combines a core component whose 
functionality is extended by innovation in complements (Suarez & Kirtley 2012; Gawer & Cusumano 
2008).  Following Gawer & Cusumano (2008) who go so far as to say that there is a relation of 
mutual dependence between the platform and complementary innovation, in addition to network 
externalities and the mediation of interactions between user groups, we suggest that utility for user 
groups in a platform market depends on complementary innovation which is often technology-
driven and affects the business models in a wide range of industries.  Consider the examples of 
online music platform iTunes and e-mail service Google mail.  iTunes meets all three criteria of a 
platform including active complementary innovation through applications that increases the value to 
users.  Google mail has fostered high levels of complementary services and innovation such as 
Google labs and social network and chat Google +, all free for users.  iTunes and Google challenge 
established business models in many other industries than their primary focus industries, music and 
Internet services.  In particular, platforms such as internal combustion engines,  newspapers, and 
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shopping malls would not be included in our definition of a platform market while they have been in 
others (Eisenmann, Parker & Alstyne 2006), since complementary innovation is not necessary to 
increase customer benefit in these markets. A platform must allow for innovation in complementary 
services, products, or business models. 
Interestingly, platform competition does not necessarily rely on Schumpeterian innovation 
(Eisenmann et al. 2011), since competition in a platform can be done through the reconfiguration of 
existing technology or services with other services or products, rather than de novo technological 
innovation.  The reconfiguration of services offered by a platform is described as “bundling” in 
economics (Nalebuff 2004) or platform “envelopment” in strategy (Eisenmann et al. 2011).  Platform 
envelopment is the combination of functionality from one platform within another platform in a 
bundle, aimed at “absorbing” the first platform’s customer base.  Envelopment is an effective 
competitive strategy due to the high switching costs and network effects that prevent entry in a 
platform market (Suarez & Kirtley 2012).  Rather than radically new functionality or technology, 
innovation in a platform market occurs therefore mainly 1) in complementary products or services, 
and 2) in the form of business model innovation, when a platform is enveloped by another.  
Achieving platform status in an industry comes through building relationships with external 
complementor firms and establishing leadership in a broader business ecosystem (Gawer & 
Cusumano (2002)).    
The concept of platform markets is closely related to the concept of multi- or two-sided markets.  
Not all two-sided markets are platform markets and not all platform markets are two-sided.  One-
sided platform markets have one user group only, such as PDF readers who are also PDF creators or 
peer-to-peer exchanges sites like Craigslist, where buyers are also sellers.  These examples bring up 
the need to differentiate between two-sided platform markets and markets where customers are all 
of the same nature but express heterogeneous demand.  The cases of platform markets often 
discussed in the literature usually can be argued in multiple ways.  For example, PDF has been listed 
as a two-sided market with readers and writers on each side, where some writers subsidise readers 
by paying for the professional PDF maker software (Rochet & Tirole, 2003).  According to our 
understanding, however, PDF is a one-sided market with customers of heterogeneous willingness-
to-pay for the platform and its full functionality.  Free PDF software solve the same problem by 
getting their revenues from advertisers. 
The exact relationship between platforms and two- and multi-sided markets has not been explicitly 
clarified in the literature on platforms.  We suggest that the role of a platform intermediary is 
distinct from simple commercial brokerage, i.e. an intermediary that facilitates transactions 
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between two user groups (whether direct or indirect).  A platform provider differs from a 
commercial broker in multi-sided markets in that the value created by the platform contains an 
intrinsic component that adds to its users’ utility independently of the facilitation of their 
interaction.  Therefore, newspapers, shopping malls, real estate agents, and night clubs, which are 
examples of two-sided markets (see Armstrong, 2006), are not platform markets.  Shopping malls 
are two-sided markets where customers and retailers interact and cross-group externalities take 
place (a consumer is better off if there are many retailers in a mall, and a retailer benefits from high 
numbers of consumers in a mall).  However, the mall owner is only a commercial broker that enables 
the direct transaction between buyers and merchants.  As a simple lieu of exchange, the mall itself 
does not have a relationship or transact with customers, thus the triangular structure of transactions 
in platform markets is broken.  The mall owner does not influence innovation in complementary 
markets or have a transforming impact on a larger set of industries as, for example, other exchange 
platforms such as stock exchanges would.   
The “information economy” has clearly participated in the spread of platform markets to a wider 
share of the economy.  As noted by Eisenmann (2007, 2011), “ranked by market value, 60 of the 
world’s 100 largest corporations earn at least half of their revenue from platform markets”.  Often, 
as shown in Tables 1-4, this value comes from the transmission of added-value digital information, 
such as recruiting sites pre-scanning professional profiles before suggesting matches, or new 
functionality such as credit cards allowing users to make purchases earlier than they otherwise 
would (Rochet & Wright, 2010) and to avoid the inconvenience of cash transactions.  We suggest 
that the introduction of ICT is a main factor of the creation of platform markets in an increasing 
number of non-related sectors including retail fashion, music, social entrepreneurship, and 
electricity.  The value of information is also a key element in the energy service platform markets 
discussed in this paper.  With Google, eBay, Amazon, Microsoft, and Intel, many examples of 
platform markets in the literature are based on information and communication technologies 
(Ceccagnoli et al. 2012; Gawer & Cusumano 2002; Economides & Katsamakas 2006). 
ICT is also defined as a General Purpose Technology (Pearson & Foxon 2012; Crafts 2004).  Just as 
platforms have been seen as “engines of growth”, GPTs have been presented in the economics 
literature as foundations of accelerated economic growth (Evans et al. 2008).  The table of examples 
(Tables 1-4) shows that some elements of the definition of GPTs, namely pervasiveness, innovational 
complementarities, and scope for improvement, may also be characteristic of platform technologies.    
The platform market supposes the existence of a platform technology, which shares common 
features with the GPT: versatility and impact on a broad range of related and unrelated industries, 
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and opportunity for high levels of complementary innovation (Moser & Nicholas 2004).  The 
platform technology has been considered the “core” of an industry in the literature (Gawer & 
Cusumano 2002).  GPTs can be distinguished from the platform technology by their level of 
complexity:  the GPT is a fundamentally simpler component with an inherent scope for technical 
improvement (Bresnahan & Trajtenberg 1995).     
Drawing on existing definitions in business and economics, our definition of a platform market is 
therefore summarised in the following points:   
Definition.  A platform market is a market where user interactions are mediated by an intermediary, 
the platform provider, and are subject to network effects.  As opposed to a marketplace or trading 
exchange, a platform intermediary must offer inherent value beyond the simple mediation process 
for the two sides of the market.  This added-value usually comes from ICT and the associated 
complementary innovation that increases utility and attractiveness of the platform to all user groups.   
-------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLES 1-4 HERE 
-------------------------------- 
II.  Platform pricing 
Pricing strategies for two-sided markets call for different considerations than typical markets and 
have been the focus of a number of economic studies (Eisenmann, Parker & Alstyne 2006).  In this 
section, the factors that affect the equilibrium pricing structure in two-sided platform markets are 
discussed: network externalities, intrinsic value, fee structure, user group subsidisation, the 
competitive structure of platform markets, single- vs. multi-homing, and proprietary vs. open 
platforms.  We extend the intuition behind the definition elements offered in the first section of this 
paper to a more formal analysis of pricing strategies in platform markets.  We focus our discussion 
on two-sided platform markets as most relevant to the case of electricity markets. 
II. 1  The utility of cross-side interactions and elasticity of demand: which user group to 
subsidise? 
The basic premise in two-sided markets mediated by a platform is that two user groups benefit from 
a service or product, implying that the platform provider has the choice to collect rents from both 
sides (called “consumers” and “producers” here) or to subsidise part or all of the cost of the 
platform for one side in order to attract a sufficient number of users on the other.  The strategic 
options are that both sides pay positive prices (e.g. newspapers), one side pays positive prices and 
the other accesses for free (e.g. some credit cards), or one side pays positive prices and the other 
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side pays negative prices, i.e. is compensated for using the platform (e.g. nightclubs or dating 
websites).  For example, nightclubs or online dating websites may subsidise women by offering free 
entry or drinks to attract more male customers.  The existence of two different tariffs for different 
user groups of a platform has been called price “discrimination” (Armstrong 2006).  The price 
difference reflects asymmetries in cross-side externalities, i.e. one side benefitting more than the 
other from the interaction.  Armstrong (2006) suggests consumers overall are made better off from 
price discrimination.   
The level to which subsidisation is effective or necessary depends on the strength of cross-group 
network externalities.  When the network externalities are high enough, i.e. when the marginal cost 
of connecting an additional user to the platform is lower than the marginal value of its connection 
for existing and prospective users,  the platform provider can apply negative prices to one user 
group and still collect overall positive profits in equilibrium (Caillaud & Jullien 2003; Economides & 
Katsamakas 2006).  In this case, the most profitable pricing strategy for a platform provider is 
sometimes to charge below marginal costs for access (Caillaud & Jullien 2003; Economides & 
Katsamakas 2006; Eisenmann et al. 2011) and for the producers’ applications  (Economides & 
Katsamakas 2006), simply to attract a wider user base.   
The formulation of optimal pricing for each side using a platform also depends on the elasticity of 
demand of users (consumers and producers) for the platform service and for the other side’s 
offering.  The elasticity of demand of users of a platform has been assumed in the literature to be 
dependent on price (Rochet & Tirole 2003) and on the utility of interacting with members from the 
other side of the platform (this is the cross-side network benefit discussed above) (Armstrong 2006), 
but also on the net utility users obtain from the platform (Hagiu 2009).  For example, the net utility 
for an operating system platform derives both from its own features and from the utility from the 
applications it can offer.  Sometimes, most of the benefit of using a platform comes from the 
applications it gives access to, such as operating systems Windows, Linux, and Apple’s OS X.  This 
relative distribution of utility determines who the platform subsidises.  When the willingness-to-pay 
of consumers is higher for the platform than the applications, the platform provider should subsidise 
application providers, whereas when the attractiveness of the applications is high relative to the 
attractiveness of the platform, the platform should subsidise consumers (Economides & Katsamakas 
2006).  In addition, when consumers have a preference for application variety, producers 
(application providers) have a higher rent extraction power, so a larger share of the profits in a 
monopolistic equilibrium fall onto the producer side (Economides & Katsamakas 2006).  The 
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platform can choose to extract more of its profit from the applications side in this case to subsidise 
consumers.   
Similarly, Hagiu (2009) finds that the platform must extract relatively more profit from the side that 
“has more power” over the other.  If consumers extract more surplus from an increased competition 
between producers, higher consumer prices should be charged by the platform in equilibrium.  The 
first proposition in Hagiu (2009) states that the relationship between the measure of market power 
of producers over consumers, the elasticity of the surplus for each consumer, and the elasticities of 
demand for consumer and producers, explicitly determines which side the platform should 
subsidise.     
Platform pricing strategies are in fact a re-allocation mechanism of costs and value, without any 
change in total economic surplus. “The platform adjusts its pricing structure to account for the 
relative division of economic surplus between consumers and producers” (Hagiu 2009).  User groups 
differ in their elasticities of demand for the platform, for the platform’s product, and for the 
interaction with the other users on the platform (cross-side and same-side network externalities).  
The side with the highest utility from interacting with the other side ends up subsidising the other 
side’s access to the platform.  The side with the lowest elasticity of demand ends up subsidising the 
other side’s access to the platform. 
The effect of same-side network externalities have been mentioned but not analysed in detail in the 
literature (Eisenmann, Parker & Alstyne 2006).  We suggest same-side network externalities could be 
added to the utility function similarly to cross-side effects, but since they are usually directly related 
to economies of scale, they can be neglected (as internalised in the marginal costs of the platform).  
Same-side network externalities in the context of power networks are discussed further in section 
IV. . 
II. 2  Intrinsic benefit? 
The existence of a benefit that is intrinsic to the platform itself independently of network 
intermediation can be found explicitly in two articles, Armstrong (2006) and Caillaud & Jullien 
(2003).  In Armstrong (2006), the term ζ𝑗
𝑖  represents the fixed benefit agent i obtains from platform 
j.  In Caillaud and Jullien (2003), the term λ represents the “quality of the matching process, the 
likelihood that there are no mistakes or errors in registration and data processing”.  In Rochet & 
Tirole (2003), this fixed utility has been set to 0.  It is also possible that the intrinsic value is higher 
for one side of the market than the other, as suggested in Hagiu (2009): consumers may benefit 
from platform differentiation while to sellers, the installed consumer base in a platform is the only 
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advantage.  We suggest that in information-based, two-sided markets that are most similar to the 
cases discussed in energy such as smart phone operating systems, online retail exchanges or social 
matchmaking websites, the platform must provide a benefit beyond the matchmaking process to 
win market share (this benefit could be superior design, superior functionality, etc.).   
II. 3  Pricing structure: Pure registration fee, pure transaction tariff, or two-part tariffs 
One of the main issues with platform pricing is whether adopting a fixed registration or subscription-
like tariff, or a transaction-based tariff, or a mix of both, is optimal.   We represent the decision 
space on a continuum in Figure 4. 
Rochet and Tirole (2003) exclude fixed tariffs from their analysis of the equilibrium cost allocation 
balance and pricing under monopoly or competing platforms.  In effect, they “take as given the 
matching process” that the platform provides, and discuss the pure transaction-based fees that arise 
as a result of platforms’ already realised market share of the other group. 
Caillaud and Jullien (2003) find different optimal strategies depending on the case.  In the case of 
pure equilibria under multi-homing, where all users of the same group make the same choice of 
platform(s) but can use more than one platform, a provider “does not have to impose a transaction 
fee to make a profit, registration fees are sufficient” to deter entry (Proposition 5).  This result 
contrasts with the case of platform competition for exclusive services (single-homing), where 
charging maximal transaction fee and no registration fee is the only option for equilibrium 
(Proposition 1).  In some cases, transaction fees may be difficulty to implement, such as when the 
transactions themselves are purely informational and give rise to no direct physical or financial 
exchanges (Caillaud & Jullien 2003).  Transactions may also be difficult or costly to monitor, 
rendering transaction-based pricing unfeasible.  Platforms then have to resort to undercutting 
registration fees in competing in multi-homing equilibria (Caillaud & Jullien 2003), which reduces 
their profits. 
Hagiu (2009) explained the use of usage fees, i.e. transaction fees, as a response to the sequential 
adoption of a platform by its two sides, which he calls the “holdup” problem.  If a platform is 
adopted by producers first, the system of royalties guarantees a certain revenue to the platform 
from the producers.  The ideal would be that the platform internalises all the revenues that 
producers derive from their interaction with consumers.   
The pricing structures and relevant parameters are shown in Figure 4.  Note that the formulae are 
based on (Armstrong 2006) only.   
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--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT Figure 4 PRICING STRUCTURE IN A PLATFORM HERE  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
In the case of energy, the question is which of these competitive equilibrium scenarios for a 
platform provider would arise.  As a network industry with a natural monopoly in the transmission 
and distribution segments, electricity markets can currently be seen as a case of exclusive services in 
a monopoly equilibrium, where producers (generators) and consumers transact through a single 
network provider.  In this case, pricing is transaction-based (Figure 4).  However, the entry of 
competing platform providers offering new services such as renewable energy contracts or energy 
management services could lead to a dominant-firm equilibrium where generators multi-home and 
residential customers multi-home (or, most likely, single-home).  In this case, the pricing structure 
would follow the evolution of telecommunications service pricing and move to two-part tariff 
structure with a subscription fee and a transaction-based component.  We discuss this issue in 
practice in the section on platform pricing in electricity markets (p. 20).   
II. 4  Monopoly vs. market-sharing competing platforms 
Interestingly, the efficient (welfare-maximising) market structure in a platform market can be 
monopolistic or duopolistic, i.e. characterised by one or up to a few dominant firms sharing the user 
base (Caillaud & Jullien 2003).  When a platform’s services are exclusive, in equilibrium, one 
dominant firm captures all users, “charges the maximal transaction fee, subsidises registration, and 
makes zero profit” in order to deter entry (Caillaud & Jullien 2003).   “In intermediation markets, and 
particularly Internet-based markets, [...] concentration does not necessarily carry strong 
inefficiencies.  Users’ surplus may have better protection in concentrated markets where one large 
intermediary dominates, provided that there is enough contestability.  Intermediation profits may 
be higher in market-sharing configurations.”  Consumers’ welfare “is higher under exclusive services 
than in any equilibrium with nonexclusive services” (Caillaud & Jullien 2003).   
II. 5  Single-homing and multi-homing: Effects on pricing strategy 
The ability of users to adopt one or multiple platforms changes the outcome of competitive pricing 
strategies.  In some platform markets such as online match-making or exchange platforms, e.g. 
Amazon and eBay, buyers can increase their probability of finding an item and sellers can increase 
their probability of selling their item, by subscribing to multiple platforms.  When one side multi-
homes and one side single-homes, which has been called “competitive bottleneck”, the interests of 
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the multi-homing side are completely ignored in equilibrium (Armstrong 2006).  The case of one side 
multi-homing and one side single-homing has been a common example in the literature.       
II. 6  Pricing decision: Not just the platform 
The pricing of the seller or producer side, which in the case of software applications and operating 
systems is the side of application developers, is usually considered exogenous to platform pricing.  
Indeed, the elasticity of demand of consumers or buyers in a platform is usually linked to the benefit 
of interaction with the seller side, without considering how much that benefit is affected by the price 
of the service or good provided by the other side.  Economides & Katsamakas (2006) model the 
effect of applications pricing as endogenous to the pricing behaviour of the platform and find that it 
makes a “very significant difference in firms’ competitive interactions and the evaluation of the 
platform applications’ competitive landscape”.  In the case of energy, there are two options for the 
price of electricity sold from suppliers to consumers: the platform provider could fully internalise the 
costs of electricity transactions into its fees, or the platform could set its fees independently from 
the suppliers’ selling price of electricity.  This is discussed in section III. 3 . 
II. 7  Proprietary vs. open-source  
An important part of the strategy of a platform is in deciding whether to be proprietary, i.e. to 
charge for complementary innovators’ and direct suppliers’ access to the platform, or whether to 
allow open-source, free development around it.  The debate is raised in Economides & Katsamakas  
(2006) around software platforms and in Boudreau (2008) around handheld computer platforms.  
Proprietary platforms have been found to be associated with higher total industry profitability while 
open-source platforms lead to higher social welfare (Economides & Katsamakas 2006).  Interestingly, 
proprietary platforms tend to win in the competitive race against open-source platforms in terms of 
market share “even when the consumers’ cost of adopting the open source platform is zero”.  
Economides & Katsamakas (2006) explain this dynamic by the fact that proprietary platforms 
internalise users’ preference for application variety, while the profit of open-source platforms does 
not (p. 1067).  In fact, they find that open-source platforms lead to more product variety.  However, 
consumers may value product quality over quantity in which case another explanation for users’ 
preference for a proprietary platform may be that proprietary platforms provide higher quality 
products. 
Boudreau (2008) studied handheld computer platforms (e.g. Palm Pilot, Psion EPOC)  as systems 
comprised of hardware and (platform) operating system providers, to assess whether loosening 
control and integration, i.e. opening a platform, would lead to an increase or decrease in innovation.   
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The results suggested a non-monotonic relationship between increasing access to a platform and 
hardware innovation, which the author explained as follows: “the benefits of a more diverse 
developer pool are quickly overwhelmed by reduced investment as openness increases, all else 
being equal”.  No strong relationship in either direction was found between opening and platform 
innovation, due to counteracting forces of greater incentives to improve the platform technology 
but diminishing returns on product development due to a higher number of hardware complement 
developers.  
Figure 5 offers a summary of the benefits for innovativeness and distribution of economic surplus 
between proprietary and open platforms. 
Proprietary platforms can also be distinguished from not-for-profit associations (Rochet & Tirole, 
2003).  An association selects an access charge with the objective of maximising volume of 
transactions rather than profit.  Examples of association-type platforms are Visa and MasterCard, 
which are set up by members of the banking and financial services sector and centrally set 
interchange fees that are proportional to transaction volume.  In this case, cardholders are usually 
favoured by the competition between banks issuing the cards, and receive benefits in the form of 
low card fees and high card benefits (Rochet & Tirole, 2003).  In electricity markets, a platform could 
be conceived as an association between the various suppliers.  The provision of the optimisation 
service of electricity does have a public good aspect to it, in that it creates benefits for the generality 
of electricity consumers. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 5 PROPRIETARY VS OPEN SOURCE PLATFORMS HERE  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
III. The case of retail electricity markets 
Can the electricity supply industry be conceived of as a platform-mediated, two-sided market?  It has 
been suggested, almost in passing, that electricity markets are evolving into platforms matching  
“consumers with specific power producers, allowing them to express their preference for cheaper 
coal or renewable power” (Eisenmann et al., 2006).  While electricity retail markets feature two 
basic elements that define a two-sided platform market, i.e. network externalities and the mediated 
interaction of two user groups, they have never typically been considered as “platform” markets.  
Electricity has always been charged to consumers on a transaction basis where per-kWh costs of 
energy delivered are added to a distributed share of fixed costs of investments in the network 
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(Steiner 1957).  The question of subsidising the consumer user-group has never been considered and 
financial transactions have always flowed linearly from consumers back to generators.   Why, and 
why might this change?   
In light of the definition offered in the first part of this paper, we suggest that electricity retail 
markets have the potential of witnessing the entry of platform providers as they acquire two 
features.  The first is volatility.  The unpredictability of renewable energy generation implies that the 
service of information and energy management contains added-value for the market, in particular 
for generators and grid operators (the supply side).  There is a systems-level benefit of balancing 
supply and demand of electricity in the market.  An optimally balanced electricity market maximises 
social surplus.  Introducing the idea of a “platform” market for electricity implies that the value and 
costs of the balancing service should be re-allocated over the market actors. On the consumer side, 
consumers are increasingly being shifted away from regulated fixed tariffs and exposed to time-
varying market prices.  Time-varying or “dynamic” pricing including real-time, time-of-use and peak 
pricing, is a way of getting domestic and commercial consumers interested in their energy 
consumption behaviour and encourages them to take a more active role in the market (Faruqui 
2010).   
The second feature is the possibility for complementary innovation in services and products due to 
the introduction of ICT.  Currently, the dimension of “information” that would be needed to allow 
the matching or intermediation process to take place is limited to wholesale electricity markets.  ICT 
introduced at the micro-scale, e.g. smart appliances, smart meters and EV charging, opens business 
model opportunities in the retail market for a service provider positioning themselves as a 
“platform” intermediary.  The intermediation process can take place in the retail market which, 
despite low profit margins, offers value capture potential due to its large market size and large 
transaction volumes. 
We describe two cases for platform services, electricity balancing services and EV aggregators, that 
are made possible with the progressive transition to an ICT-intensive “smart” power system. We 
discuss the positioning of the platform entrant in the market, and how platform pricing may be an 
increasingly sensible strategy in the future compared to traditional marginal cost pricing.  The focus 
of the discussion is on distribution and retail supply, i.e. the distribution system (Figure 6).  We begin 
with a brief overview of the market actors in a typical electricity market at an advanced stage of 
liberalisation: England and Wales. 
III. 1  Market actors and changing roles in the competitive landscape 
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The value chain of electricity distribution and supply has traditionally been linear from generation, 
transmission and distribution, to retail supply.  A schematic representation of the current market 
and its actors in England and Wales is shown in Figure 6.   
----------------------------------------- 
INSERT Figure 6 ABOUT HERE  
Market liberalisation and recent policy-driven changes are transforming the system into a 
decentralised value constellation.  From a vertically bundled supply chain, electricity network 
industries are morphing into value networks “with multiple entry and exit points” and new business 
models, as did the telecom industry following liberalisation (Li & Whalley 2002). The 
telecommunications sector has seen the emergence of competing platforms, e.g. for mobile smart 
phones and home service bundles with broadband, TV and telephony, that have all been shifting 
revenues to all-inclusive subscription tariffs.  The retail electricity sector has yet to experiment with 
similar business models.    
A particularly important change is the role of residential and small commercial consumers, who 
increasingly hold value as resources for the grid system as loads (energy “sinks”), generators (micro-
generation in homes), and storage devices (e.g. electric vehicle batteries).  Consumers are 
encouraged by current regulation to provide “demand response” services (as electricity sinks that 
can be switched on or off) through participative contracts (Ofgem 2010).  Residential and 
commercial end-users are starting to be informed of their real-time costs, consumption patterns, 
and of the origin of their electricity. The partial self-supply of household users from solar panels and 
combined heat and power plants (CHPs), particularly if coupled with batteries such as electric vehicle 
batteries, is also expected to affect the dynamics of the national market.  The value of domestic 
consumers as grid resources is at the heart of the transition to a platform market for electricity.  The 
complexity of the “consumer” side, as uptake devices, generators, and flexible resources, with 
differentiated elasticities of demand, is what makes a platform mediator coming with smart 
optimisation capabilities viable and even necessary.   
On the supply side, legally-binding policies to reduce CO2 emissions from the electricity supply 
sector
1 are supporting the integration of renewable energy generation.  The decarbonisation of electricity 
is accompanied with increasing volatility of supply, which requires adjustments in business models 
1 Target:- 90% of CO2 emissions form the electricity sector by 2030 (UK Department of Energy and Climate 
Change 2011). 
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and market mechanisms.  Wind and solar energy, which could provide up to 40% of the energy 
needed to meet the 15% target production from renewable sources in the UK by 2020 (UK 
Department of Energy and Climate Change 2011), are both intermittent and unpredictable in timing 
and quantity.  Financial incentives such as those laid out in the Electricity Market Reform (EMR) are 
necessary to increase the attractiveness of such investments for power producers.2    
The main drivers for the changing electricity market landscape are therefore regulations and policies 
encouraging the transition to a low-carbon, competitive, and innovative electricity system.  The 
introduction of smart meters creates opportunities for innovation in new services, products, and 
business models, based on newly available consumption data.  Increasing the efficiency of the 
distribution system through smart energy management solutions reduces the need to invest in 
reinforcements of distribution lines, transformers, and other assets (Anaya & Pollitt, 2013).    These 
elements create opportunities for complementary innovators to solve some of the issues with the 
volatility; two examples are discussed in the next section. 
III. 2  Cases 
III.2.1 Case: Balancing services 
The idea of a platform provider for balancing services is that a company or market player could 
manage the electricity load from household and commercial consumers and sell the service to the 
market players who benefit from the certainty of uptake and the maintenance of grid stability, 
namely generators, suppliers (also referred to here as ESCOs), and distribution network operators 
(DNOs).  Under ongoing RIIO3 regulation of DNOs in the UK, quality of customer service and 
efficiency of operations and investments will be factored into the calculation of network operator 
revenues.  However, the ultimate beneficiaries of increased predictability and flexibility (or quick 
reaction times) of domestic load on the system are the ESCOs and generators, who enter advance 
delivery agreements.  They bear the costs of lost (renewable) production and the penalty of sourcing 
additional power from the balancing market for end-users.  For an estimate of the frequency and 
2 First, contracts-for-difference guarantee that producers of renewable energy generation units at both the 
micro-/residential scale and at small-scale (1 to 2 MW) will be compensated for the energy they produce, 
whether or not it is in excess of market demand.  The establishment of a market for capacity also manages the 
production risk that is associated with the volatility of supply from renewable energy plants, by compensating 
asset owners for making the capacity available, whether or not it is running. 
3 Revenues= Investment + Innovation + Outputs, the new regulatory framework for DNO revenues in the UK 
(Ofgem 2010). 
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magnitude of shortages in the UK electricity market, see Figure 2 in (Strbac 2008).  The total size of 
the balancing services market was £623 million in the UK in 20124 (National Grid, 2013). 
Currently, the balancing market in the UK is managed at the level of the transmission system by the 
transmission system operator (National Grid) who sends requests to producers (wholesale) and 
suppliers (retail) to ensure frequency and voltage stability.  The balancing mechanism manages the 
intra-day hourly adjustments for physical power when the day-ahead market has not accurately 
forecasted the load on the system.  Power traded on the balancing (and reserve) market is more 
expensive than pre-scheduled power (Newbery 2011).  Imbalance energy prices, or the price of 
buying or selling power on the balancing market relative to the day-ahead power market, are 
estimated at £4/MWh in the UK, and could rise up to £8/MWh with increasing wind generation.  The 
costs of handling intermittency make it a highly valuable proposition to suppliers and generators to 
avoid last-minute variability.   
There is no such service at the level of the distribution system.  Due to the integration of micro- and 
small-scale generators with intermittent production, in order to avoid last-minute adjustments 
through the current balancing market, an intermediary service provider acting between households 
and retail suppliers could offer a buffer for excess supply by managing large household appliances 
and a virtual power plant “reserve” in the form of loads connected on the consumer side that can be 
switched off in times of undersupply (Silva et al. 2011).  The enablers of such an intermediation 
service are the introduction of smart meters and the equipment of domestic appliances with IP 
addresses.  Studies have shown that the value of energy savings from individual household 
appliances increases as the installed capacity of wind power increases; a typical fridge could provide 
savings from £2 to £32 per year as installed wind capacity increases from 10 to 40 GW (Silva et al. 
2011).  While the individual savings to consumers are low, the availability of dishwashers, 
refrigerators and freezers, and space heating and cooling for scheduling delays or temporary 
interruptions is highly valuable for grid operators and suppliers, who avoid curtailing their energy or 
having to sell at negative prices.  Since both sides of the market benefit from what is essentially an 
optimisation service based on information intermediation, the balancing service provider can price 
its service on both sides of the market.  We discuss the details of a pricing strategy in section III. 4 . 
It is interesting to consider in further detail who the specific actors are in this platform market 
configuration (Figure 2).  Who could be the balancing service platform provider?  Clearly, incumbent 
4 In 2008 the value of the balancing services market was £563 million.  We leave for a future study to assess 
whether the market is undergoing a positive growth trend in real terms. 
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electricity suppliers have a competitive advantage to provide the service of energy management to 
their customers themselves.  ESCOs already have the customers and know their energy consumption 
patterns.  In the UK, it is also likely that ESCOs will maintain ownership of their customers’ smart 
metering data (IBM 2013) which constitutes a barrier to entry to a third party entrant.  ESCOs have 
all of the operations, knowledge and capabilities to supply electricity to customers.  Adding a smart 
demand management service to their current value proposition would simply be a matter of 
implementing current optimisation strategies at a finer level of detail (household appliances rather 
than households, or blocks of households).  If the ESCOs take on the role of platform service 
provider, the other side of the market would be generators who sell the electricity to them.     
However, existing ESCOs have little interest in reducing demand and limiting their sales.  New 
entrants could challenge the incumbency advantage of ESCOs and attempt to attract a larger user 
base that belonged to multiple ESCOs.  Start-up companies and established ICT solutions companies 
in retail electricity markets could be interested by the balancing service role, as long as they can 
afford the regulatory licences to qualify as electricity suppliers.   
Another main barrier to entry here would be to get access to sufficient customer data to create 
significant value from the service.  Access to data from smart meters is planned to be highly 
regulated to protect consumer privacy in the UK (Anderson & Fuloria 2012).  In other countries, such 
as Norway, the data will be available to the public provided some reference checks are passed 
(Statnett 2012). Finally, balancing services could be provided as part of an energy service contract 
offered by any retailer with direct customer relationships, such as financial institutions and 
supermarket chains.  The technical ability to control loads to switch them on and off, finally, is 
outside of the remit of data management or other retail companies.  Any such third-party entrant 
would have to partner with an ESCO for the operational side of their business to control domestic 
loads. 
Each of these potential platform providers of balancing services are listed in Figure 2.  The platform 
would alter the structure of the electricity market in Figure 6 as shown in Figure 7. 
------------------------------------- 
INSERT Figure 7 ABOUT HERE  
------------------------------------- 
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III.2.2 Case: Electric vehicle aggregator 
Electric vehicles (EV) can be seen as one particular device connected to the distribution grid in 
homes or in other locations that can offer a flexible source of demand, storage, and generation.  The 
concept of an EV aggregator has been discussed in the literature as an entity that would manage and 
control the charging and discharging of EVs optimally for the grid (Quinn et al. 2010).  We present 
the idea of the EV aggregator business model as a platform that mediates between the needs of 
drivers of up to millions of grid-connected vehicles and the suppliers, generators, and distribution 
network operators in the retail market.   
A fleet of plugged-in vehicles represents a very attractive resource for grid operations as each 
connected vehicle can be switched on and off quasi-instantaneously (SCE 2012).  EV batteries have a 
storage capacity of 24 kWh for most 100-mile range vehicles going up to 85 kWh for higher 
performance EVs.  This energy storage capacity therefore represents more than the daily demand of 
two average UK households (11 kWh/household/day in 20135).  An individual EV is sufficient for a 
back-up power source of up to 2 days of power supply in an energy efficient home (KEPCO 2013).  
EVs have a wide range of charging power acceptance, from 1.4 kW in North American households up 
to 120 kW with “superchargers”.    
An EV aggregator is a platform service provider that offers added-value to consumers through the 
use of their car to benefit the grid.  The EV aggregator monetises the resource of the EV battery on 
behalf of the customer (driver) by optimising its charging behaviour as is beneficial for the 
distribution grid operator and/or electricity supplier.   
The “platform” here is in the charging management service, which individual consumers are unable 
to carry out directly themselves but helps them capture value from their EV battery.  Batteries 
represent up to 40% of the costs of a new EV (Tanaka 2013), so the value of using the battery for 
auxiliary energy services can potentially decrease the initial cost to consumers and improve the 
economics of purchasing an EV (Move About 2012).  The platform provider would therefore be 
selling cost savings to consumers: this is the case of negative or 0 prices discussed in section II. , 
where the supply side of the market subsidises the other.  Indeed, the supply side (grid or retail 
suppliers) can multi-home and is indifferent to which platform it chooses, as long as the platform 
gives them access to as many EV batteries as possible.  The supply side can subscribe to multiple EV 
5 Department of Energy and Climate Change, 2013.  Statistics publication series: Energy consumption in the 
UK.  Chapter 3: Domestic data tables, Table 3.11 Household average daily electricity use.  Publication URN 
13D/157. 
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aggregators as long as it is efficient to do so: it is thus the subsidising side and its interests are 
neglected in the platform’s strategy to attract users.   
Similarly to the case of balancing services, the second side of the market that would be willing to pay 
for the service from EVs are the electricity supply companies, if they need to manage imbalances 
due to renewable generation, or the DNO who needs to manage sudden power demand surges.  In 
contrast with other domestic appliances, EVs pose a risk on local distribution networks and assets.  
The connection of multiple EVs in a neighbourhood around the same time, for example, may 
overstress the network locally6.  These risks are associated with high financial stakes.  DNOs are 
therefore potentially direct users of an EV aggregating service platform. 
Considering what type of firm might enter as a platform provider of EV services, de novo entrants 
could be service companies specialised in EV charging management, or existing charging 
infrastructure companies that add the service to their offering (Figure 2).  Incumbent business 
solutions and data management could also enter the business of EV charging management.  Finally, 
EVs could simply be managed by a balancing service platform as described above, as a component or 
a particular type of household appliance. 
The platform technology for EV aggregation services is the charging “network”, which includes the 
ICT with or without the hardware network.  Most charging infrastructure companies do or plan to 
integrate smart charging solutions.  Beyond the role of the traditional aggregator, which is to bundle 
multiple EV reserves to sell in the wholesale or balancing markets, a platform market here suggests 
the existence of diverse added-value services through complementary innovation and ICT. 
III. 3  Platform pricing in electricity 
The first salient conclusion from these cases is that having a single electricity market price for all 
residential and small commercial consumers could become obsolete in the new competitive 
landscape.  Instead, electricity pricing should reflect the new realities of the system: 
• differentiated needs for quality (consumer) 
• differentiated elasticities of demand (consumer) 
• differentiated environmental preferences (consumer) 
• differentiated service preferences (consumer) 
6 In terms of total national energy demand, a mass shift of private transportation to EVs would not represent 
more than a 5 – 10 % increase in demand (Statnett 2012; Electric Power Research Institute 2007; Autolib’ 
2013).  This additional energy demand could be met with no or little additional investment in generation 
assets.   
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• differentiated ability to provide services as resources (consumer) 
• differentiated service offerings (supply) 
• increased volatility (supply) 
• availability of more granular data (supply). 
The introduction of ICT that will allow information such as the origin source of electricity flows to be 
“attached” electricity will be the enabler of such product differentiation (Abe et al. 2011).   
The second apparent conclusion from the cases is that a fee-based pricing method may best reflect 
the new interaction dynamics between generators, distributors, suppliers and end-users, as opposed 
to traditional marginal cost, transaction-based pricing. The allocation of electricity and value flows 
between market agents has the aspects of a platform service for two main reasons.  First, the 
complexity of transactions and interactions in retail electricity markets can be expected to increase 
significantly in the next years, which makes it more costly to keep track of transactions.   The 
complexity and lack of transparency of tariffs for customers could be simplified into simple fixed fee-
type pricing. Second, the intermediation service makes it possible to achieve an optimally balanced 
system and benefit both sides of the market.  This raises the need to re-allocate value and costs in 
such a platform.  
Just as pricing strategies in telecom networks have moved away from call-based charges to 
subscription plans to access the network, offering various options for unlimited calls to certain 
phones, or unlimited text messages, we suggest it makes increasing sense to charge customers for 
electricity supply plans under the emerging market conditions.  The plan prices would be designed 
so as to encourage certain behaviours and to give up certain rights such as an unlimited, 
undifferentiated supply of electricity.  The next section explores platform pricing theory in a general 
case of balancing services in electricity retail markets. 
III. 4  Cost allocation in a monopoly platform for electricity services 
In retail electricity markets the number of suppliers can be considered as fixed as there is a limited 
number of potential suppliers of retail electricity, whereas the consumer group is potentially very 
large – up to 28 million households in the UK (Silva et al. 2011).  A platform could acquire up to all 
consumers and all suppliers in the market.   
The savings on the domestic electricity bill which a consumer can obtain are finite and reduced by 
the platform fee, so consumers have an interest in single-homing in electricity service platforms.  In 
contrast, the energy supplier could decide to join multiple energy management platforms, so as to 
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cover all customers in a country or region.  As suppliers may multi-home they are not being courted 
by the platform; the rents they collect for supplying electricity are reduced by the price set by the 
platform to guarantee uptake of their production.  The case of electricity markets is therefore similar 
to a competitive bottleneck case in Armstrong (2006) where one side single-homes and one side 
multi-homes.  
In the case of electricity, as opposed to platforms such as operating systems, telecoms networks, 
file-sharing/cloud services, and online databases, the consumer does not need to go through a 
platform intermediary to obtain the good: he could stay with a traditional direct relationship to a 
supplier.  However, a platform provider that internalises the price of energy would improve the 
efficiency of the market and reduce transaction costs. The services featured in the platform must 
therefore bring an added-value to the user.  In economic terms, the implication of the consumer-
related differentiation factors mentioned in section III. 3  above is that traditionally inelastic demand 
for electricity becomes elastic as a function of quality (reliability, flexibility, and security of supply) 
and environmental benefits (the demand for renewables vs. fossil fuels for each consumer will 
depend on the price differential).  On the supplier side, we assume that the utility obtained from the 
platform depends on its intrinsic features, on the benefit from the number of consumers the 
platform reaches: the network externality parameter, on the value the supplier firm place on 
efficiency7, and on the value they place on reducing volatility8.   
In practice, households that are more sensitive to price changes and are willing to give up more 
control to the platform to shift, interrupt, or reduce their energy consumption, offer higher 
potential for volatility reduction and efficiency gains.  Consumers with higher elasticities of demand 
are therefore a more valuable resource to the system and should be compensated proportionally.      
If two-sided market pricing strategies are applied in electricity markets, a long history of marginal 
cost pricing in the sector would be overturned.  While marginal cost pricing was found to be the 
most effective solution in electricity to deal with the problem of sizing the system’s (generation and 
T&D) capacity for peak load (Boiteux 1960; Houthakker 1951; Ruggles 1949; Steiner 1957; 
Williamson 1966), the entry of a platform service provider for balancing services in the retail market 
provides an alternative solution to the peak load problem.  A platform service provider could use 
stricter controls than price-based incentives to limit the demand at peak times, by effectively 
7 As mentioned previously, the new RIIO regulation incentivises efficiency by factoring part of the gains into 
the distribution network operators’ revenue calculation. 
8 The value of reducing volatility is high for generators with intermittent renewable power who must stay as 
close as possible to their production programme to avoid balancing costs and penalties, as mentioned above. 
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making some decisions on behalf of the consumer (constrained by pre-specified preferences).  The 
alternative would be to provide an information service only, such as a web application that informs 
consumers of how to change their behaviour in real time to generate savings.  If electric vehicle 
penetration remains low, the platform firm could purchase assets such as storage devices of its own 
to adjust capacity for times of peak demand.   
 
IV.  Electricity platforms: A new concept? 
The electricity market has always had a network element that was a natural monopoly and acted as 
an intermediary between electricity generators and retail suppliers: the grid (Figure 6).  In the 
physical electricity market, the transmission and distribution network operator could be seen as a 
platform “intermediary” as he is responsible for ensuring the balance of supply and demand at all 
times in the system.  The equivalent in financial markets for electricity would be the trading 
mechanism (such as a power pool).  Residential and small commercial loads are only considered in 
aggregate as loads, however, and so far the power system optimisation only takes places at the 
wholesale level.  Our cases suggest this might change. 
The electricity network or grid is characterised by economies of scale, where the high fixed costs of 
grid assets are paid for by consumers through T&D fees per kWh of energy consumed.  The more 
consumers connect, the lower the average cost distributed over them.  Consumers also benefit from 
same-side network externalities, as electricity network investments are more justified in areas 
where more people connect.  Economies of scale are in fact a subset of same-side network 
externalities: users benefit from the presence of more users on the system due to lower prices and 
more capacity investment.  This effect takes place up to a point at which the positive network 
externality becomes negative and the connection of additional marginal customers requires grid 
reinforcements and additional investments in generation capacity (Ruggles 1949).  One might also 
affirm that the fact that consumers benefit from competition in retail supply is a type of cross-side 
network effect, as price-based competition should reduce final energy prices.  Both of these effects 
take place in traditional electricity markets. 
The establishment of a true platform market for retail electricity with cross-side network 
externalities is limited, however, as long as electricity is considered an undifferentiated 
commoditised product.  The platform services described in our cases can only occur as a result of 
the differentiation of consumer preferences for electricity based on source, price, and quality of 
supply.  The transition to a smarter system with real-time pricing, ICT, smart meters and appliances, 
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leads to the possibility (and value) of an intermediation service provider to match consumers with 
specific energy services based on the newly available energy data.  Cross-side network externalities 
start to become significant if suppliers can rely on participative consumers as resources.  In this case, 
platform pricing makes sense in order to redistribute the costs in the system based on the cross-side 
and same-side network externalities. 
Who bears the costs in a platform market for electricity?  As we have seen, the supplier side benefits 
from the reduction of volatility and losses as well as from the stimulation of innovative activity in the 
electricity market which can attract new entrants in complements and open opportunities for new 
specialised services.  We have shown that the supplier, due to the network externality effect, has an 
interest in helping the platform attract as many consumers as possible to gain control over their 
devices (appliances or EVs).  In addition, there is a collective social benefit to increased platform 
adoption by consumers, because the solutions to the optimisation problem are more robust when 
more players participate, echoing Caillaud & Jullien (2003)’s point that a consolidated platform 
market does not necessarily carry inefficiencies.  As for consumers, we have shown that consumers 
with higher elasticities of demand, who offer the most flexibility to the platform service provider, 
should be favoured in the pricing strategy.  Customers with high overall demand are the most 
interesting to attract for balancing services (Strbac 2008) and should receive priority for lower 
platform fees.  Further research should explore if demand elasticity is correlated with income to 
understand the distribution of impacts of such a strategy on lower income groups. 
How many consumers should an electricity platform aim to acquire and at what cost?  As with the 
current network effects, there is likely to be a saturation point for balancing services at which the 
value of each additional customer for the balancing service decreases (Silva et al. 2011).  Smart 
metering data on energy consumption will help platform entrants identify which customers are the 
most valuable to integrate in the balancing service or smart EV charging system. 
One reason to support third party entry for platform services, rather than internalise an equivalent 
optimisation service within existing electricity suppliers, is to stimulate innovation in electricity 
markets (Jacobides et al. 2006).  Outsourcing the energy management service is a way of ensuring 
that new entrants and complementary providers will capture value in this market.  Entry in the 
market between electricity distributors and end-users was previously inefficient due to low profit 
margins and relatively invariant consumer tariffs.  In this paper we have argued that the match-
making service is now becoming valuable and platform competition in electricity markets would 
drive innovative, value-added services that would be necessary to incentivise consumer adoption in 
the first place.   
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There are two possible configurations of the balancing service platform: one where all the electricity 
transactions in the household are entirely managed through the platform, and one where the 
consumer still purchases most of its electricity from the supplier but also joins a platform for the 
extra service of optimal energy management.  In a two-sided market subscription-based tariff 
where the platform provider controls all of the electricity transactions between consumers and 
suppliers, as described in section III. 4 , the price of electricity sold from supplier to consumer can be 
internalised in the platform fee.   
If the electricity platform provider internalises the price of the product, it would set a very different 
competitive structure than in other platform markets such as operating systems/applications, video 
game/consoles, and mobile phones/networks, where the platform and its associated products are 
paid for independently.  The most clear comparison point would be mobile phone subscriptions.  
Another similar case to electricity services might be that of online music platforms such as Spotify or 
Soundcloud.  Spotify accounts provide unlimited access to music via online streaming for a flat 
monthly subscription fee as well as music recommendations based on friends’ playlists and personal 
history.  The comparison with electricity platforms becomes interesting where ownership is 
concerned: despite the unlimited access to music, Spotify customers cannot download the pieces 
and therefore choose “use” of the music over ownership.  In the case of electricity balancing 
services, customers relinquish some control over their household appliances and energy demand, 
which is equivalent to giving up a small part of ownership.    A simpler tariff structure might reduce 
costs by avoiding the need to track the exact response of every household and would reduce the 
costs of customer complaints in billing. 
One important point is the similarity of the outcome for consumers between a pure subscription-
type fee for a platform retail energy service and the current fixed tariffs.  The platform provider 
effectively shields consumers from variable time-of-use prices that are both inconvenient for them 
to track and understand, and that expose them to price risks that are beyond their control.  In 
exchange for this “protection”, consumers offer the platform the right to control – fully or partially – 
their load according to the optimal production times in the system.  In this sense, the platform 
would allow the introduction of real-time pricing of electricity in the retail market to bring about its 
intended efficiency benefits to the system without the ethical concern of adversely impacting the 
distracted consumer (Hogan 2010; Faruqui 2010). 
V.  Conclusions 
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In conclusion, this paper shows that platform business models and two-sided pricing strategies can 
be expected to be part of the transition to a low-carbon efficient electricity system.  The electricity 
retail market is emerging with the elements of a platform market, namely a need and high added-
value for one or more “match-making” intermediaries between suppliers who cannot predict their 
generation and consumers who start participating in active energy demand management.  This type 
of market matching service is currently in place for wholesale electricity markets and could be 
replicated as an optimisation service for the retail market with the entry of platform providers.  The 
“matching” service of balancing supply and demand on local distribution networks would maximise 
social surplus in the system by enabling an efficient, low-loss, sustainable electricity market.  As 
such, we found that an electricity platform could follow a two-sided pricing strategy where one side 
subsidises the other.  In the context of electricity, a competitive bottleneck is likely to occur where 
suppliers can adopt multiple platforms to increase coverage and efficiency of the optimisation 
service, while consumers single-home.  In this case, suppliers benefit from cross-side positive 
network externalities and are expected to partly or fully pay for the platform service and subsidise 
the consumer side.  
We highlight that the entry of platform service providers as described in this paper through the 
cases of electricity balancing services and electric vehicle charging management, has the effect of 
shielding consumers from the unintended consequences of smart metering.  The view that real-time 
pricing, enabled by the introduction of smart meters in the retail electricity sector, will be beneficial 
to the system, is often found in the literature (e.g. Faruqui et al. 2010).  However, the unintended 
consequences of real-time pricing may overwhelmingly affect the more vulnerable consumers who 
do not have the capabilities to manage their energy demand.  The introduction of a platform market 
to optimise household electricity management has the potential to reduce customer energy bills 
while providing demand-response services to electricity suppliers, the cost of which can be primarily 
distributed on the supply side who can increase their profits from higher value-added services.  
Subscription-based fees in an electricity platform market protect households from the volatility of 
real-time prices, while allowing these signals to be reacted upon by the platform mediator.   
We also conclude that while the platform service could be provided by incumbent utilities and 
ESCOs, the value of the service justifies the entry of third party entrants distinct from existing 
players.  These new entrants will have the additional benefits of stimulating innovation and new 
capital investment in the sector.  ICT companies, for example, can bring new capabilities for smart 
energy management as well as for fostering complementary innovation in the market. 
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The optimal level of platform adoption by consumers remains to be determined.  Some consumers 
will be more valuable resources for the supply side and grid management and the costs of customer 
acquisition for a platform requires these customers to be targeted by the platform first.  In this 
sense, an electricity platform is different from typical platform markets where the network 
externality effect is unbounded and the platform’s aim is to reach full market penetration.  More 
subtly than in credit card markets, an electricity platform provider still has to convince two sides of 
the market to subscribe to be able to sell its service.  In the case of electricity, a platform could be a 
partial or a full intermediary between consumers and their electricity suppliers, depending on the 
exact business model design. 
Reviewing the literature on platform markets, we emphasise the “intelligence” aspect of a platform, 
as well as the opportunity for innovation and the establishment of innovation ecosystems, which 
distinguish it from ordinary marketplaces or input-supplier relationships in traditional markets.  This 
research extends the intuition that ICT is an important component of a platform in a formal 
definition (section I. ).  We also distinguish the platform market from the platform technology 
(Gawer & Cusumano 2008). 
The UK government suggests that a total of £110 billion of investment is needed towards the 
decarbonisation of the electricity sector in the UK by 2020 (UK Department of Energy and Climate 
Change 2013).  The value of the balancing services market in the UK is on the order of £623 million 
per year (National Grid 2013), a large share of which could be captured by a platform service 
provider.  A platform intermediary that minimises losses and improves the utilisation of the system 
in the retail sector therefore offers a valuable service to both consumers and suppliers. Ultimately, 
despite the competitive threat that new energy management platforms would pose to established 
utilities’ sales and customer base, one objective of the sector is to increase investments in the 
industry from new players (UK Department of Energy and Climate Change 2013).  The entry of new 
platform-type service providers from the IT and software sectors would allow new capital into the 
sector and fulfil the objective to develop its innovativeness. 
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Figures 
 
 
Figure 1. Platform in a traditional electricity market 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Platform in balancing services market              Figure 3.  Platform in electric vehicle market 
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Figure 4. Pricing structure in a platform: From pure transaction to pure subscription tariffs. 
 
 
Figure 5.  Proprietary vs. open-source platforms 
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Figure 6. Conventional market structure in the electricity supply industry in England and Wales 
 
Figure 7. Modification of the market relationships (Figure 6) with two platform entrants: balancing services and electric 
vehicle aggregating agents. 
 
 
Sources: Adapted from Simmonds (2002); updated from (UK Department of Energy and Climate 
Change 2012b; Ofgem 2012)
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Tables 
Table 1. Examples of industries that have transitioned from non-platform markets (see table below) to becoming Internet-based “platform” markets 
Features 
Examples 
Cited in Number of 
user groups 
Network 
externalities 
Platform 
technology 
Complementary 
innovation 
Added-value platform 
(inherent) 
General-
purpose 
technology 
Impact on 
un-related 
industries 
Facilitates 
exchange or 
processing of 
digital 
information 
Web search (Eisenmann, 
Parker & 
Alstyne 
2006) 
3 
(websites, 
readers, 
and 
advertisers) 
Cross-side 
positive? 
Internet High (e.g. semantic 
web) 
High (customized intelligent 
search, bundle with other 
Internet services like e-mail 
and chat) 
Internet High  Yes 
File storage: Cloud 
computing (e.g. 
Dropbox, Google 
Drive, Sugarsync, 
iCloud) 
New! 1 (users) Same-side 
positive 
Internet High High (Remote access, sharing, 
security) 
Internet 
and ICT 
High Yes 
Online retail, music, 
trading platforms, 
and auctions (e.g. 
eBay, Amazon 
MarketPlace, Rocket 
Internet, iTunes, 
Spotify) 
(Hagiu & 
Wright 
2011) 
1 or more 
(1 for peer-
to-peer 
selling; 2 
for buyers 
and sellers) 
Cross-side 
positive 
Internet Medium-High Medium (time saving, 
information completeness 
and symmetry, convenience) 
–these are mostly related to 
the utility in interaction 
mediation 
Internet  Limited- 
Mostly on 
business 
model of  
given 
industry 
Yes 
News and 
educational media 
(Parker & 
Van Alstyne 
2005) 
3 (readers, 
publishers, 
and 
advertisers) 
Cross-side 
positive between 
readers and 
publishers 
Internet Medium (online 
education changes 
in learning methods, 
news changes e.g. 
wiki and contributor 
blogs) 
High (more interactive 
content, real-time dynamics, 
unlimited access to news...) 
Internet  Limited Yes 
Dating, recruiting, 
and social 
networking websites  
(Armstrong 
2006; Hagiu 
& Wright 
2011; 
Boudreau & 
Hagiu 2009) 
2 or 3 
(generally 2 
user groups 
and 
advertisers) 
Cross-side 
positive except 
with advertising? 
Internet Low-medium Medium (efficiency and 
symmetry of information) – 
mostly related to interaction 
mediation 
Internet Not 
necessarily – 
mostly on 
advertising 
Yes 
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Table 2. Contested examples of platform markets 
Features 
Examples 
Cited in Number of 
user groups 
Network 
externalities 
Platform 
technology 
Complementary 
innovation 
Added-value 
platform 
(inherent) 
General-
purpose 
technology 
Impact on un-
related 
industries 
Facilitates 
exchange or 
processing of 
digital information 
Electricity 
networks 
(Eisenmann, 
Parker & Alstyne 
2006) 
2 (generators 
and 
consumers) 
Cross-side 
positive 
Transmission 
grid 
Low Low Electricity High No 
TV networks (Rochet & Tirole 
2003) 
2 (channel 
providers and 
viewers) 
Cross-side 
positive 
Television and  
screen 
technology 
Low-medium Low Transistor, 
electricity 
Medium 
(mostly 
advertising and 
media) 
No 
Shopping malls, 
retail services, real 
estate agencies 
(Hagiu & Wright 
2011) 
2 (buyers and 
sellers) 
Cross-side 
positive 
None Low Low None (other 
than 
electricity) 
Limited No 
Stock exchange, 
auctions 
(Parker & Van 
Alstyne 2005) 
2 (buyers and 
sellers) 
Cross-side 
positive 
None Low Low None Medium Yes 
Newspapers, 
academic journals 
(Parker & Van 
Alstyne 2005; 
Rochet & Tirole 
2003) 
2 (readers and 
writers) 
Cross-side 
positive 
Print  Low Low Printing press No No 
Yellow page 
directories  
(Armstrong 2006; 
Eisenmann, Parker 
& Alstyne 2006) 
2 (companies 
and 
consumers) 
Same-side 
positive 
Print Low Low Printing press No No 
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Table 3. New and confirmed examples of platform markets 
Features 
Examples 
Cited in Number of user 
groups 
Network 
externalities (other 
than economies of 
scale) 
Platform 
technology 
Complementary 
innovation 
Added-value 
platform 
(inherent) 
General-
purpose 
technology 
Impact on 
un-related 
industries 
Facilitates 
exchange or 
processing of 
digital 
information 
Electric vehicle 
charging 
infrastructure 
and service 
network 
New! 2 (car owners and 
electricity 
suppliers) 
High Charging 
infrastructure and 
ICT (Cloud 
services) 
High High Electricity 
and ICT 
Medium-
High  
Yes 
Retail electricity 
balancing 
services 
New! 2 (distribution grid 
operators and 
consumers) 
Medium ICT High Medium ICT Limited Yes 
Healthcare 
database 
systems 
(Watson) 
New! Multiple (health 
professionals, 
consumers, and 
complementary 
service providers) 
Not necessarily Database 
system/software 
High High (improved 
evidence-based 
practice, service 
personalisation) 
ICT Potentially 
high 
Yes 
Telephone 
networks 
(Eisenmann, 
Parker & 
Alstyne 2006) 
1 (call makers and 
receivers) 
Not necessarily ICT (Wired and 
wireless network) 
High High ICT High Yes 
Credit cards 
(Amex) 
(Rochet & 
Tirole 2003) 
2 (merchants and 
consumers) 
Cross-side positive Chip and card Medium High ICT High Yes 
Operating 
systems 
(Rochet & 
Tirole 2003) 
2 (application 
developers and 
consumers) 
Cross-side positive; 
same-side 
(application 
developers) 
negative; same-
side (consumers) 
positive when 
proprietary 
platform 
Computers, smart 
phone or tablet 
High High ICT and 
processors 
High Yes 
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Table 4. Platform technologies 
Features 
Examples 
Cited in Number of user 
groups 
Network 
externalities 
(other than 
economies of 
scale) 
Platform 
technology 
Complementary 
innovation 
Added-value 
platform 
(inherent) 
General-
purpose 
technology 
Impact on 
un-related 
industries 
Facilitates 
exchange or 
processing of 
digital 
information 
Video game 
consoles 
(Rochet & 
Tirole 2003) 
2 (players and 
game developers) 
Cross-side 
positive 
Game console 
or supporting 
device 
High Low Graphics 
processing unit, 
AI technology 
Low No 
Processors (e.g. 
Intel, ARM) 
(Economides & 
Katsamakas 
2006)  
1 (electronic device 
manufacturers) 
No Transistor and 
processor itself 
High High Transistor High Yes 
DVDs 
(previously, 
VHS) 
(Eisenmann, 
Parker & 
Alstyne 2006) 
2 (viewers and 
content providers) 
Cross-side 
positive 
DVD and player Medium High (quality, 
durability) 
Data 
compression 
format 
High No 
Wifi equipment (Eisenmann, 
Parker & 
Alstyne 2006) 
2 (laptop users and 
access points) 
Cross-side 
positive 
Router High High Internet High Yes 
Text processors 
and portable 
document 
readers 
(Rochet & 
Tirole 2003) 
1 (readers and 
writers) 
Same-side 
positive 
Computers and 
other 
supporting 
devices 
Low High Computer High Yes 
Gasoline-
powered 
engines 
(Eisenmann, 
Parker & 
Alstyne 2006) 
3 (car owners, car 
sellers and energy 
suppliers) 
No Internal 
combustion 
engine 
Low High Internal 
combustion 
engine 
High No 
 
Added-value in the platform considered “low” when it is only a matter of changing user functionality. 
34 
 
EPRG 1334 
References 
Abe, R., Taoka, H. & McQuilkin, D., 2011. Digital grid: Communicative electrical grids of the future. 
IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, 2(2), pp.399–410. 
Anaya, K.L. & Pollitt, M., 2013. Understanding best practice regarding interruptible connections for 
wind generation: Lessons from national and international experience. EPRG Working Paper 
1308, pp.1–31. 
Anderson, R. & Fuloria, S., 2012. On the security economics of electricity metering. 
Armstrong, M., 2006. Competition in two-sided markets. The RAND Journal of Economics, 37(3), 
pp.668–691. 
Autolib’, 2013. Interview with Dr. Morald Chibout, Director General at Autolib’, Paris, France. 
Boiteux, M., 1960. Peak-load pricing. The Journal of Business, pp.157–179. 
Boudreau, K., 2008. Does Opening a Platform Stimulate Innovation? Effects on Modular and 
Systemic Innovation. MIT Sloan Research Paper, 4611-06, pp.1–33. 
Boudreau, K. & Hagiu, A., 2009. Platform rules: Multi-sided platforms as regulators. In Platforms, 
Markets and Innovation. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, pp. 163–191. 
Bresnahan, T. & Trajtenberg, M., 1995. General purpose technologies “Engines of growth”? Journal 
of econometrics, 65, pp.83–108. 
Caillaud, B. & Jullien, B., 2003. Chicken & egg: Competition among intermediation service providers. 
RAND journal of Economics, 34(2), pp.309–328. 
Ceccagnoli, M., Forman, C. & Huang, P., 2012. Cocreation of value in a platform ecosystem: The case 
of enterprise software. MIS Quarterly, 36(1), pp.263–290. 
Crafts, N., 2004. Steam as a general purpose technology: A growth accounting perspective*. The 
Economic Journal, 114(April), pp.338–351. 
Economides, N. & Katsamakas, E., 2006. Two-Sided Competition of Proprietary vs. Open Source 
Technology Platforms and the Implications for the Software Industry. Management Science, 
52(7), pp.1057–1071. 
Eisenmann, T., Parker, G. & Alstyne, M. Van, 2006. Strategies for two-sided markets. Harvard 
business review, pp.92–101. 
Eisenmann, T., Parker, G. & Van Alstyne, M.W., 2006. Strategies for two-sided markets. Harvard 
business review, 84(10), p.92. 
Eisenmann, T., Parker, G.G. & Van Alstyne, M.W., 2011. PLATFORM ENVELOPMENT. Strategic 
Management Journal, 32, pp.1270–1285. 
35 
 
EPRG 1334 
Electric Power Research Institute, 2007. Environmental assessment of plug-in hybrid electric 
vehicles. EPRI-NRDC Report 1015325, 1. 
Evans, D.S., 2011. Platform economics: Essays on multi-sided businesses, MIT Press. 
Evans, D.S., 2003. Some Empirical Aspects of Multi-sided Platform Industries. Review of Network 
Economics, 2(3), pp.191–209. 
Evans, D.S., Hagiu, A. & Schmalensee, R., 2008. Engines of growth: How software platforms drive 
innovation and transform industries, MIT Press. 
Faruqui, A., 2010. The Ethics of Dynamic Pricing. The Electricity Journal, 23(6), pp.13–27. 
Faruqui, A., Harris, D. & Hledik, R., 2010. Unlocking the €53 billion savings from smart meters in the 
EU: How increasing the adoption of dynamic tariffs could make or break the EU’s smart grid 
investment. Energy Policy, 38(10), pp.6222–6231. 
Gawer, A. & Cusumano, M., 2008. How companies become platform leaders. MIT Sloan 
Management Review, 49(2), pp.28–35. 
Gawer, A. & Cusumano, M.A., 2002. Platform leadership: How Intel, Microsoft, and Cisco drive 
industry innovation, Harvard Business School Press. 
Hagiu, A., 2009. Two-Sided Platforms: Product Variety and Pricing Structures. Journal of Economics & 
Management Strategy, 18(4), pp.1011–1043. 
Hagiu, A. & Wright, J., 2011. Multi-sided platforms. Harvard Business School Working Paper 12-024. 
Hogan, W.W., 2010. Fairness and Dynamic Pricing: Comments. The Electricity Journal, 23(6), pp.28–
35. 
Houthakker, H., 1951. Electricity tariffs in theory and practice. The Economic Journal, 61(241), pp.1–
25. 
IBM, 2013. Interview with J. Bentley, IBM, London, UK. 
Jacobides, M., Knudsen, T. & Augier, M., 2006. Benefiting from innovation: Value creation, value 
appropriation and the role of industry architectures. Research Policy, 35(8), pp.1200–1221. 
Katz, M.L. & Shapiro, C., 1994. Systems competition and network effects. The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 8(2), pp.93–115. 
KEPCO, 2013. R&D News Kansai 2013. , 473. 
Kohrs, R. et al., 2012. Charging strategies for a smart home connected battery electric vehicle. In 
Electric Vehicle Symposium 26. pp. 1–6. 
Li, F. & Whalley, J., 2002. Deconstruction of the telecommunications industry: From value chains to 
value networks. Telecommunications Policy, 26, pp.451–472. 
36 
 
EPRG 1334 
Moser, P. & Nicholas, T., 2004. Was electricity a general purpose technology? Evidence from 
historical patent citations. The American Economic Review, 94(2), pp.388–394. 
Move About, 2012. Interview with Michael Eimstad, Co-founder and CEO of Move About, Oslo, 
Norway. 
Nalebuff, B., 2004. Bundling as an entry barrier. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, pp.159–187. 
National Grid, 2013. Monthly balancing services summary data. 
Newbery, D., 2011. Contracting for wind generation. Economics of Energy and Environmental Policy, 
1(2). 
Ofgem, 2012. Electricity distribution annual report 2010-11. 
Ofgem, 2010. Handbook for implementing the RIIO model. 
Parker, G.G. & Van Alstyne, M.W., 2005. Two-Sided Network Effects: A Theory of Information 
Product Design. Management Science, 51(10), pp.1494–1504. 
Pearson, P.J.G. & Foxon, T.J., 2012. A low carbon industrial revolution? Insights and challenges from 
past technological and economic transformations. Energy Policy, 50, pp.117–127. 
Quinn, C., Zimmerle, D. & Bradley, T.H., 2010. The effect of communication architecture on the 
availability, reliability, and economics of plug-in hybrid electric vehicle-to-grid ancillary services. 
Journal of Power Sources, 195(5), pp.1500–1509. 
Rochet, J. & Tirole, J., 2003. Platform competition in two-sided markets. Journal of the European 
Economic Association, 1(4), pp.990–1029. 
Rochet, J.-C. & Wright, J., 2010. Credit card interchange fees. Journal of Banking & Finance, 34(8), 
pp.1788–1797. 
Ruggles, N., 1949. Recent developments in the theory of marginal cost pricing. The Review of 
Economic Studies, 17(2), pp.107–126. 
SCE, 2012. Interview with Ed Kjaer, Director of Plug-in readiness program at Southern California 
Edison, California, US. 
Silva, V. et al., 2011. Smart domestic appliances as enabling technology for demand-side integration: 
Modelling, value and drivers. In T. Jamasb & M. G. Pollitt, eds. The Future of Electricity Demand: 
Customers, Citizens and Loads. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Simmonds, G., 2002. Regulation of the UK electricity industry. CRI Industry brief. 
Statnett, 2012. Interview with A. Lont, CEO of Statnett, Oslo, Norway. 
Steiner, P., 1957. Peak loads and efficient pricing. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, pp.585–610. 
Strbac, G., 2008. Demand side management: Benefits and challenges. Energy Policy, 36(12), 
pp.4419–4426. 
37 
 
EPRG 1334 
Suarez, F.F. & Kirtley, J., 2012. Dethroning an Established Platform. MIT Sloan Management Review, 
53(4), pp.35–41. 
Tanaka, K., 2013. Interview with Prof. Tanaka, University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan. 
UK Department of Energy and Climate Change, 2013. Electricity Market Reform: Delivering UK 
Investment. 
UK Department of Energy and Climate Change, 2012a. Feed-in tariffs scheme: Consultation on 
Comprehensive Review Phase 2A: Solar PV Cost Control. 
UK Department of Energy and Climate Change, 2012b. UK Energy Sector Indicators 2012. 
UK Department of Energy and Climate Change, 2011. UK Renewable Energy Roadmap. 
Williamson, O., 1966. Peak-load pricing and optimal capacity under indivisibility constraints. The 
American Economic Review, 56(4), pp.810–827. 
 
38 
 
